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COMPELLED SPEECH, EXPRESSIVE 
CONDUCT, AND WEDDING CAKES: 
A COMMENTARY ON 
MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP V. 




It may be impolite to talk with a full mouth, but is it constitutional 
to ban speaking through baking a cake? In Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. 
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Supreme Court is considering 
whether the First Amendment gives businesses the right to refuse to 
serve same-sex marriages.1 This case will determine the balance 
between same-sex couples enjoying the “equal dignity” of marriage 
and those that still oppose these marriages “based on decent and 
honorable religious or philosophical premises.”2 Wedding vendors and 
same-sex couples nationwide may be deeply impacted by the balance 
the Court strikes.3 
This commentary argues that the lower courts correctly ruled that 
Jack Phillips did not have a right to refuse to serve Charlie Craig and 
David Mullins any custom-made cake for their wedding. However, cake 
baking can serve as expressive conduct under some circumstances not 
met here. Therefore, the remedy issued by the lower courts is overbroad 
and unconstitutional because it could force Phillips to create cakes that 
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 1.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, NO. 16-111 (U.S. 2017). 
 2.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602, 2608 (2015). 
 3.  See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (discussing a 
photographer who refused to take wedding photos for a same-sex couple); Lexington Fayette 
Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., NO. 2015-CA-000745, 2017 WL 
2211381 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017) (dealing with a T-shirt printer who refused to print t-shirts 
for a pride parade). 
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include speech without satisfying strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court 
should affirm in part and reverse in part, remanding to the lower courts 




Jack Phillips owns Masterpiece Cakeshop, where he and his 
employees design and create custom cakes for weddings and other 
occasions.4 When creating these unique and expensive wedding cakes,5 
Phillips meets with his clients to learn their preferences, desires, and 
wedding plans, and incorporates these personal details into the cake 
design.6 Phillips seeks to run his business in harmony with his Christian 
beliefs, including by closing on Sundays and refusing to create cakes for 
occasions that he disagrees with, such as Halloween and same-sex 
weddings or commitment ceremonies.7 
In 2014, Charlie Craig and David Mullins, along with Craig’s 
mother Deborah Munn, went to Masterpiece to inquire about 
purchasing a unique cake for a wedding reception in Colorado to 
celebrate their impending marriage in Massachusetts.8 After learning 
about their intentions, Phillips said he would not create their cake 
because same-sex marriage was illegal in Colorado and he would not 
make cakes for illegal commitment ceremonies.9 Phillips said he would 
sell them goods for other events and the couple and Munn left.10 The 
next day, Munn called Phillips who reiterated that he did not create 
cakes for any illegal weddings and added that his Christian beliefs 
prevented him from making cakes for any same-sex wedding, legal or 
illegal.11 Craig and Mullins later married in Massachusetts and 
 
 4.  Joint Appendix at *157, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, NO. 
16-111, 2017 WL 4232758 (Aug. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. 
 5.  Id. at *170, *174. See MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP WEDDING, http://masterpiece 
cakes.com/wedding-cakes/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2018), for examples of Phillips’ unique, custom-
made cakes. 
 6.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at *161. 
 7.  Id. at *164–65. 
 8.  They married in Massachusetts because same-sex marriage was not legal in Colorado at 
that time. Id. at *39. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at *39, *60. 
 11.  Id. at *39–40 
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celebrated with a rainbow-themed wedding cake in Colorado among 
family and friends.12 
Craig and Mullins filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights 
Division (Division), which enforces the Colorado Anti-Discrimination 
Act (CADA), that Phillips’ refusal to bake a wedding cake for a same-
sex wedding constituted discrimination on the basis of sexuality.13 The 
Division issued a probable cause determination in Craig and Mullins’ 
favor, which was sustained by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).14 
Phillips lost his appeals to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and 
later to the Colorado Court of Appeals.15 The Colorado Court of 
Appeals rejected Phillips’ first amendment defenses, affirming the 
remedy.16 The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari,17 and the 
United States Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case.18 
B. Legal Background 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a place of public accommodation subject 
to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA).19 CADA forbids 
discrimination on the basis of, among other things, sexual orientation.20 
Places principally used for religious purposes, such as churches, are not 
covered by CADA, but Phillips does not claim Masterpiece is such an 
establishment.21 The First Amendment states that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” and this restraint 
also applies to state governments.22 Closely held corporations, like 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, are protected by the First Amendment.23 
Speech protection is not confined to words alone, whether written 
or spoken, but also to expressive conduct.24 To determine whether a 
 
 12.  Id. at *175–76. 
 13.  Id. at *47–52. 
 14.  Id. at *69. 
 15.  Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2014). 
 16.  Id. at 283. 
 17.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at *259–60. 
 18.  Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 466, 466–67 (2017). 
 19.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(5.3) (2014) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)). 
 20.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a). 
 21.  Id.; Brief for Petitioners at *45, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, NO. 16-111, 2017 WL 3913762 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. 
 22.  U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 23.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014) (closely held 
corporations should be treated just as nonprofit corporations, which can bring claims under 
RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause). 
 24.  See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (“Chief Justice 
Hughes led this Court in holding that the display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition by 
peaceful and legal means to organized government was protected by the free speech guaranties 
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regulation of conduct violates the Free Speech Clause, first the Court 
must decide if the conduct was expressive.25 If expressive, the Court 
then must decide if the regulation is related to the expression.26 The 
level of scrutiny the Court applies depends on whether the regulation 
indeed targets the expressive conduct; when the government compels 
expressive activities, strict scrutiny applies and the regulation or 
remedy must be narrowly tailored to a compelling state purpose.27 If 
the regulation does not implicate expressive conduct, the regulated 
actor will not have any First Amendment claims to raise.28 The Court 
has created a two-pronged test to determine whether conduct is 
expressive.29 
The first prong is evaluating whether the conduct is traditionally 
protected.30 The Court is able to avoid comparing the relative 
communicative merits of specific conduct or works by categorizing 
entire groups of mediums as expressive.31 This conduct does not need 
to be articulable or even contain a “particularized message” to be 
expressive.32 When the Court determines that regulated conduct falls 
under one of these mediums, it will simply apply strict scrutiny rather 
than evaluating the conduct for its particular expressive content.33 For 
example, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group 
of Boston, the Supreme Court found that the organizer of a private 
parade did not violate a state anti-discrimination law by refusing to let 
 
of the Constitution.”). 
 25.  See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) (the hanging of an 
American flag outside of a dorm room window with a peace symbol superimposed after the U.S. 
invasion of Cambodia was “a pointed expression of anguish by appellant about the then-current 
domestic  and foreign affairs of his government”). 
 26.  See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (the government interest in 
forbidding the burning of draft cards was unrelated to the suppression of anti-war speech). 
 27.  See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795–801 (1988), Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 9–21 (1986) (plurality opinion) and 
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254–58 (1974) for courts that evaluated 
compelled speech under strict scrutiny. 
 28.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 61–62 (2006) 
(regulations requiring law schools to engage in specific types of non-expressive speech did not 
give rise to a First Amendment Claim). 
 29.  See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1989) (burning flags in protest is expressive). 
 30.  Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995). 
 31.  See Brief of American Unity Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at *7, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111, 2017 WL 4918194 (U.S. 
Oct. 26, 2017) (“Having courts decide case by case whether a particular painting conveys enough 
of a message would require aesthetic judgments that courts are ill-equipped to make.”) 
[hereinafter Brief of American Unity Fund]. 
 32.  Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. 
 33.  Id. 
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a gay and lesbian group participate in the march.34 Parades, the Court 
reasoned, are a traditionally expressive medium, a category that also 
includes activities such as painting, music, poetry, displaying or saluting 
flags, or wearing armbands.35 In the Court’s view, the state had, by 
forcing the parade organizers to include a particular group, required 
the organizers to adopt expressive conduct and change the message the 
parade was intended to convey.36 
Under the second prong, not traditionally expressive mediums can 
receive first amendment protection if “[a]n intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and the likelihood was great that 
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”37 For 
example, in Texas v. Johnson, the Court determined that flag burning 
has an “overtly political nature” that was “intentional and 
overwhelmingly apparent.”38 This is an objective rather than subjective 
test because it takes into account how apparent the communication was 
to observers, and is highly contextual.39 
In Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the Court applied this two-part test and found 
that a law requiring law schools to host military recruiters was not 
inherently expressive.40 Under prong one, the Court contrasted 
traditionally expressive mediums, like parades of Hurley and 
newspapers,41 with school military recruiting, which the Court 
determined was “not inherently expressive.”42 Under prong two, the 
Court concluded that “there was little likelihood that the views of those 
engaging in the expressive activities would be identified with the 
owner, who remained free to disassociate himself from those views.”43 
After all, the law school was only a medium through which the 
recruiters expressed their own message.44 
 
 34.  Id. at 557. 
 35.  Id. at 569. 
 36.  Id. at 572–73. 
 37.  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 
410–11 (1974)). 
 38.  Id. at 407. 
 39.  Id. at 405–06, (the communication behind the burning of an American flag was 
“overwhelmingly apparent”). 
 40.  See generally Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 41.  See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257–58 (1974) (discussing a state 
statute requiring newspapers to give a right to reply to political candidates attacked in editorials 
was unconstitutional). 
 42.  Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 64, 66. 
 43.  Id. at 65 (discussing the holding in Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 
(1980)). 
 44.  See id. (“There [is] little likelihood that the views of those engaging in the expressive 
JENSEN READY FOR ISSUE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2018  3:36 PM 
152 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13 
II. HOLDING 
The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission in finding that Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop 
violated CADA.45 The lower court rejected Phillips’ Free Speech 
Clause arguments because it found that baking cakes for same-sex 
weddings was not expressive conduct.46 It also upheld the 
Commission’s three-part cease and desist order.47 This remedy first 
required that Masterpiece “cease and desist from discriminating 
against [Craig and Mullins] and other same-sex couples by refusing to 
sell them wedding cakes or any product [it] would sell to heterosexual 
couples.”48 Second, it required Masterpiece to “take remedial measures, 
including comprehensive staff training and alteration to the company’s 
policies to ensure compliance with CADA.”49 Third, Masterpiece was 
required to “file quarterly compliance reports for two years with the 
Division describing the remedial measures taken to comply with 
CADA and documenting all patrons who are denied service and the 
reasons for the denial.”50 
III. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
Phillips and Masterpiece concede all the relevant facts, namely that 
Phillips denied Craig and Mullins his services because they wanted a 
wedding cake to celebrate their same-sex marriage.51 He argues that his 
refusal was based on his Christian religious beliefs which hold that 
same-sex weddings are immoral, and he feels that he cannot assist in 
what he considers to be the celebration of immoral activities.52 In 
refusing the respondents, Phillips claims the Free Speech Clause and 
the Free Exercise Clause shield him from the requirements of 
Colorado’s anti-discrimination law. This commentary will only focus on 
the compelled speech defenses under the Free Speech Clause, although 
 
activities would be identified with the owner.”). 
 45.  Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd., 370 P.3d 272, 280 (Colo. App. 2014). 
 46.  Id. at 286. 
 47.  Id. at 294. 
 48.  Id. at 286. 
 49.  Id. at 277. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 21, at *10. 
 52.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at *157–58, *164–65. 
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the petitioner makes potentially successful claims invoking the 
protection of the Free Exercise Clause.53 
Phillips first claims that he does not violate the statute because he 
does not discriminate against same-sex couples; he is willing to sell 
them products for birthdays and other occasions.54 Furthermore, he 
would refuse any person seeking to buy a cake for a same-sex wedding, 
no matter their sexual orientation, just like he would refuse anyone 
looking to buy Halloween cakes or products for any other occasion 
deemed immoral by Phillips.55 Because he is refusing to provide goods 
for a specific event (a same-sex ceremony) rather than for specific 
people (same-sex individuals), he claims his actions fall outside of the 
statute.56 Therefore, the Commission overstepped its bounds in issuing 
summary judgement against him and should be reversed. 
Even if his refusal to serve falls within the confines of the statute, 
Phillips argues that his creation of custom cakes is expressive conduct 
which is protected under the First Amendment, under the two-prong 
expressive conduct test.57 Wedding cakes, to Phillips, play an integral 
role in wedding ceremonies and are inherently meaningful and 
celebratory.58 The newlywed couple cutting the cake is often a central 
element of the post-wedding celebration and is long grounded in 
historical practice.59 If guests of Craig and Mullins saw them celebrate 
their commitment with a Masterpiece cake created by Phillips, they 
would take this to mean that Phillips approves of and is celebrating the 
marriage as well, contrary to his true feelings.60 Therefore, creating 
 
 53.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 21, at *38–48. For discussion of Free Exercise Clause 
claims see Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, NO. 16-111 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2017) (arguing that the 
Free Exercise Clause protects Phillips from being forced to participate in a religious ritual he 
disagrees with through baking a cake). See also Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, NO. 16-111 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2017) (Phillips is protected by the Free Speech Clause, 
Religion Clauses, and Due Process Clauses); cf. Brief of Freedom From Religion Foundation as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, NO. 16-111 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2017) (Phillips’ Free Exercise Rights are not implicated 
here). 
 54.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at *168. 
 55.  Id. at *165-67. 
 56.  Reply Brief for Petitioners at *6—7, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, NO. 16-111, 2017 WL 5644420 (U.S. Nov. 22, 2017). 
 57.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 21, at *17. 
 58.  Id. at *19, *21–22. 
 59.  Id. at *6. 
 60.  Id. at *24. 
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wedding cakes is expressive conduct because it meets both prongs of 
the Supreme Court’s expressive conduct test.61 
Phillips claims that he is more artist than baker to emphasize that 
his wedding cakes are artistic expression.62 This status is reflected by his 
bakery’s name (Masterpiece Cakeshop), its logo (which includes a 
paintbrush), its décor (large picture of Phillips holding a paintbrush), 
and its products (unique, customized, beautiful baked goods, including 
cakes).63 Because he engages in activities like those of painters and 
sculptors, he should likewise be protected from being forced to create 
art by the government.64 If the government could do otherwise, it would 
compromise the artistic freedom guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.65 
Therefore, Phillips claims the first part of the Commission’s remedy 
violates the compelled speech doctrine by forcing Phillips to create 
wedding cakes for same-sex weddings, which is expressive conduct.66 
The regulation fails strict scrutiny because it does not serve a 
compelling interest and is not narrowly tailored.67 The Commission 
wrongly applied CADA to Phillips and acted unconstitutionally by 
disregarding Phillips’ free-speech rights, which protects Phillips.68 Thus, 
the Commission’s summary judgment should be reversed, and the 
order should be found to conflict with Phillips’ rights under the Free 
Speech Clause.69 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
The respondents see allowing an exemption under the First 
Amendment for business owners to flout CADA as opening a door for 
discrimination against any number of groups. Craig and Mullins argue 
that CADA absolutely extends to refusal to serve same-sex weddings 
and that Phillips’ refusal to make a cake is not protected by the Free 
Speech Clause.70 They further argue that businesses open to the public 
 
 61.  Id. at *24–25. 
 62.  Id. at *18. 
 63.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at *160. 
 64.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 21, at *20–21. 
 65.  Id. at *28. 
 66.  Id. at *27–29. 
 67.  Id. at *49. 
 68.  Id. at *17. 
 69.  Id. at *61. 
 70.  Brief of Respondents Craig and Mullins at *10, Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, NO. 16-111, 2017 WL 4838415 (U.S. Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for 
Respondents]. 
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must follow anti-discrimination laws even if they sell artistic products.71 
Phillips did not deny them service because of the message they asked 
him to express, but because Craig and Mullins are gay.72 Because the 
regulation is content- and viewpoint-neutral, the government action’s 
effects on Phillips’ speech were only incidental and justified with a 
compelling purpose of preventing discrimination.73 This law furthers 
the substantial government interest of “fostering full inclusion in civic 
life” thus meeting this standard.74 
The respondents further argue that cakes are not expressive 
conduct because they are not inherently expressive nor are they likely 
to be understood as expressive speech.75 First, baking cakes is 
fundamentally different from other forms of expressive conduct that 
are protected by the First Amendment.76 Although creative and 
requiring skill, custom wedding cakes are unlike sculptures and 
paintings because they are not generally recognized as art.77 
Furthermore, the claim that people will intuit Phillips’ support of gay 
marriage from his creation of the cake is unreasonable.78 Phillips 
overstates the symbolic role of cakes in weddings.79 Because Phillips 
refused to create any wedding cake for the couple, he cannot know 
what type of message the cake would be sending.80 It is impossible for 
Phillips to have known whether they would have requested a pre-made 
or pre-designed cake. Because he did not know what type of cake they 
wanted or even if they wanted a unique design, he could not have 
known it would have been expressive, thus undermining his artistic 
expression claim.81 
The respondents claim that policy also suggests the petitioners’ 
proposed First Amendment exemption from CADA for cake makers is 
unworkable.82 Allowing this exception would create a slippery slope 
that would deny services to LGBT minorities, especially in rural areas 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at *26–27. 
 73.  Id. at *23–24. 
 74.  Id. at *37. 
 75.  Id. at *29–30. 
 76.  Id. at *19–20. 
 77.  See Id. 
 78.  Id. at *34–35. 
 79.  Id. at *34. 
 80.  Id. at *27. 
 81.  Id. at *46. 
 82.  Id. at *45. 
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where the number of vendors may be very limited.83 Furthermore, such 
an exception would cause dignitary harm to LBGT individuals 
everywhere and reduces the ability of same-sex couples to marry, which 
is a fundamental constitutional right.84 The same logic would also allow 
bakeries to refuse service to interfaith or interracial marriages and 
other significant, meaning-laden ceremonies.85 This exemption is much 
broader than a Free Exercise exemption would be because it does not 
need to be rooted in religious beliefs but can be for any reason at all.86 
It can also be used to discriminate against any group (including race, 
gender, ethnicity, and religion) by any business with creative or artistic 
products (such as those crafted by tailors,  cosmetologists, designers, 
and landscapers) for any event (baptisms, anniversaries, or birthdays).87 
This exception would swallow anti-discrimination law.88 
The respondents assert that because neither the law nor the remedy 
violated any of Phillips’ constitutional rights, he can have no exemption 
to anti-discrimination laws. The commission and the appellate courts 
were correct in issuing and affirming the remedy, which should be 
upheld here as well. 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Requiring Phillips to create wedding cakes for same-sex marriages 
does not always compel expressive conduct 
Creating wedding cakes, even artistic, expensive, unique cakes is not 
necessarily expressive conduct. Phillips’ conduct fails to satisfy either 
prong of the Court’s expressive conduct test. Therefore, the Free 
Speech Clause is not implicated and the statute remains valid. The 
court below correctly found that Phillips violated CADA by refusing 
to create any cake for Craig and Mullen’s wedding. 
Historically, wedding cakes have not been protected as expressive 
conduct under the inherently expressive medium prong in the Free 
Speech Clause nor does Phillips’ self-conception as an artist elevate his 
craft into one of these mediums. Lines must be drawn to divide speech 
 
 83.  Brief of Respondent Colorado Civil Rights Commission at *57—58, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, NO. 16-111, 2017 WL 4838416 (U.S. Oct. 23, 2017). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Brief for Respondents I, supra note 70, at *2. 
 86.  Id. at *45. 
 87.  Id. at *47–48. 
 88.  Id. at *45–50 (giving hypotheticals of religious and racial discrimination the respondents 
claim will be allowed by the petitioner’s proposed exemption). 
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and non-speech, and traditionally recognized mediums are an 
important guide in doing so. Unlike parades, paintings, or sculptures, 
which have been repeatedly protected,89 case law has not extended Free 
Speech Clause rights to cake makers, suggesting that it is not a 
traditionally protected category. Phillips argues that his profession is 
essentially the same as painting or sculpting,90 and this self-conception 
is certainly supported by his shop’s decorations and name.91 However, 
branding oneself as an artist cannot be enough to receive the 
protections of traditionally protected artists. Otherwise any 
craftsperson or artisan or Subway employee could declare themselves 
an artist engaging in protected speech.92 Allowing such a broad 
interpretation would eviscerate discrimination law since, as one amici 
curiae brief argues, “effectively any form of human activity could be 
recast as a form of First Amendment protected expression.”93 A 
Subway Sandwich Artist is not engaging in speech by refusing to 
“sculpt” sandwich “art” for a LGBT customer.94 And while baking 
requires greater creativity and artistic talent than sandwich making, it 
does not join parades as a historical medium of expression. 
Even though cake baking is not traditionally protected, it may still 
be symbolic speech if it is intended to and likely to convey a particular 
message. Whether a given expression meets these factors requires a 
factual inquiry into the context.95 Phillips asserts that when he creates 
cakes he intends to convey a specific message, one that is likely to be 
understood by his customers and their wedding guests.96 However, no 
particularized message was requested since Phillips denied Craig and 
Mullins service before learning of their specifications and design 
preferences.97 Without knowing what words or designs would be 
incorporated, the cake would not be likely to convey any particular 
message. A blanket refusal to serve any form of wedding cake fails the 
second prong. 
 
 89.  Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. Of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995) (paintings, parades, poetry, and music are “unquestionably protected” as expressive 
conduct). 
 90.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 21, at *20. 
 91.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at *160. 
 92.  SUBWAY CAREERS, https://apply.mysubwaycareer.com/us/en/careers/ (last visited Mar. 
10, 2018) (beginning workers at Subway Restaurants have the title Sandwich Artist). 
 93.  Brief of American Unity Fund, supra note 31, at *14. 
 94.  Id. at *11. 
 95.  See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) (“In characterizing such action for First  
Amendment purposes, we have considered the context in which it occurred.”). 
 96.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 21, at *8–9. 
 97.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at *39. 
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Phillips’ conduct is not expressive speech here because it satisfied 
neither prong. Therefore, the government did not violate his Free 
Speech rights. The lower court’s determination that Phillips violated 
CADA in this instance should be affirmed. 
B. Baking a cake could be expressive conduct 
While a general blanket refusal to bake a cake for a same-sex 
wedding is not expressive conduct, certain types of cakes do satisfy the 
two-pronged test of expressive speech. The Colorado Court of Appeals 
admitted this possibility, saying “a wedding cake, in some 
circumstances, may convey a particularized message celebrating same-
sex marriage and, in such cases, First Amendment speech protections 
may be implicated.”98 While cake baking is not and is unlikely in the 
foreseeable future to become an inherently expressive form of conduct 
like parades or flag burning, they can be designed to bear a 
“particularized message” that viewers are likely to understand 
especially when the cake has written inscriptions.99 
For example, had Craig and Mullins asked Phillips to bake them the 
tiered rainbow cake they later enjoyed at their reception, Phillips’ 
refusal would have been protected by the First Amendment. A rainbow 
cake references a widely recognizable symbol of the LGBT rights 
movement for decades.100 Individuals, businesses, and other 
organizations regularly use the rainbow to signal support for gay rights 
and same-sex marriage. Indeed, hours after the Court released Hodges 
v. Obergefell, the White House was awash in rainbow lights celebrating 
the landmark moment in same-sex rights.101 The combination of a 
particularized message (support for same-sex marriage and LGBT 
rights in general) with the strong likelihood that observers would 
understand this message results in clear expressive speech. 
Bakers should also not be compelled to write any particular 
message on their cakes. Written speech is not subject to the expressive 
conduct test, but rather the traditional compelled speech analysis which 
requires the application of strict scrutiny.102 Other forms of wedding 
 
 98.  Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd., 370 P.3d 272, 288 (Colo. App. 2014). 
 99.  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)). 
 100.  Paola Antonelli, MoMA Acquires the Rainbow Flag, MOMA: INSIDE/OUT (June 17, 
2015), https://www.moma.org/explore/inside_out/2015/06/17/moma-acquires-the-rainbow-flag/. 
 101.  Adam B. Lerner, White House Set Aglow With Rainbow Pride, POLITICO (June 26, 2015, 
10:07 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/white-house-set-aglow-with-rainbow-pride-
119490. 
 102.  See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that a state cannot constitutionally 
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vendors are even more likely than bakers to engage in expressive 
speech.103 These may include musicians, painters, and photographers 
who create traditional forms of inherently expressive conduct.104 
C. The lower court’s remedy is overbroad and compels Phillips to 
speak 
The remedy first issued by the Colorado Commission could 
impermissibly compel Phillips to engage in expressive conduct against 
his will. The first element of the remedy requires that Phillips make any 
cake he would make for a heterosexual customer that he would make 
for a homosexual customer.105 This includes any personalized design or 
written inscription.106 The Colorado Court of Appeals recognized in 
dicta that written messages would potentially intrude on Phillips’ First 
Amendment rights.107 But the same court allowed a remedy that would 
restrict these rights in a way that would not survive strict scrutiny. The 
remedy must be narrowed to allow Phillips to assert his Free Speech 
rights when asked to create an expressive cake. 
This remedy is overbroad because it ignores that the expressive 
messages of the cakes are highly dependent on context. Two couples, 
one heterosexual and one homosexual, could request an identical cake 
with the intent to create entirely different meanings, thus potentially 
forcing Phillips to speak a message he disagrees with. For example, a 
rainbow cake at a LGBT wedding or commitment ceremony would 
have a particularized message (support of same-sex marriage and 
LGBT pride) that would be clearly understood by viewers.108 An 
 
require a citizen to disseminate a written ideological message on a license plate); W. Va. State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (“Objection to this form of communication when 
coerced is an old one, well known to the framers of the Bill of Rights.”). 
 103.  See Brief of American Unity Fund, supra note 31, at *4 (“[T]he government cannot 
compel photographers, videographers, graphic designers, printers, painters, or singers to record, 
celebrate, or promote events they disapprove of, including same-sex weddings.”). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd., 370 P.3d 272, 286 (Colo. App. 2014) (“As noted, 
the Commission’s order requires that Masterpiece ‘cease and desist from discriminating against 
[Craig and Mullins] and other same-sex couples by refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any 
product [it] would sell to heterosexual couples.’” (alterations in original)). 
 106.  Transcript of Oral Arguments at *81–82, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 2017 WL 6025739 (U.S. 2017). 
 107.  Masterpiece, 370 P.3d at 288 (“We recognize that a wedding cake, in some circumstances, 
may convey a particularized message celebrating same-sex marriage and, in such cases, First 
Amendment speech protections may be implicated. However, we need not reach this issue. We 
note, again, that Phillips denied Craig’s and Mullins’ request without any discussion regarding the 
wedding cake’s design or any possible written inscriptions.”). 
 108.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 21, at *22. 
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identical cake at a wedding for a opposite-sex couple could mean 
support for LGBT rights or a love of Hawaii or of the Wizard of Oz. 
Alternatively, if two couples that ordered a cake inscribed with the 
phrase “God Bless this Wedding” or “God Approves of this Marriage,” 
Phillips would certainly agree with the message for the opposite-sex 
couple, but probably not the same-sex couple. Under the remedy, 
Phillips would have to create the same cake for either couple, 
compelling him to express a message with which he disagrees. Either 
he can comply and speak against his will and conscience, or he can 
refuse to bake the cake for both couples. 
The remedy as laid out by the lower court would compel Phillips to 
speak and therefore must be subject to strict scrutiny, a standard rarely 
met in the free speech context.109 The government must show a 
compelling interest and a restriction narrowly tailored to address that 
interest.110 At least three compelling interests are asserted to justify the 
strict scrutiny.111 First, the Colorado Court of Appeals found one 
compelling interest to be ensuring that “goods and services . . . are 
available to all of the state’s citizens.”112 Here, there is no evidence that 
Craig and Mullins were prevented from obtaining the goods and 
services they wanted. To the contrary, they received a wedding cake for 
free.113 Second, the state claims that denying service will have negative 
economic impacts by “prevent[ing] the economic and social 
balkanization prevalent when businesses decide to serve only their own 
‘kind.’”114 However, the state has not introduced evidence that this is 
occurring and must rely on more than predictive or ambiguous proof.115 
A third compelling interest may be the dignitary harm suffered by 
couples rejected and demeaned because of their sexuality.116 However, 
the Court has been reluctant to recognize the prevention of stigmatic 
or emotional injuries as compelling government interests, except in 
 
 109.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010) (finding, for the first and 
only time, that compelled speech satisfied strict scrutiny where regulation that restricted money 
given to organizations with ties to terrorist groups). 
 110.  Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716–17 (1977) (analyzing the State’s asserted 
compelling interests and finding that the means were not sufficiently narrowly tailored). 
 111.  Masterpiece, 370 P.3d at 293–94. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Joint Appendix, supra note 4, at *185. 
 114.  Masterpiece, 370 P.3d at 293. 
 115.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786, 799–800 (2011) (holding that California’s 
burden of proof is higher than intermediate scrutiny and “ambiguous proof will not suffice”). 
 116.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 70, at *6. 
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some Establishment Clause cases.117 Furthermore, the remedy is under-
inclusive, and thus not narrowly tailored, when stigmatic injury is the 
relevant compelling interest because it fails to prevent emotional harm 
being done to LGBT individuals at his place of business.118 Indeed, the 
lower court specifically encourages Phillips to express his opposition to 
same-sex marriage, as long as he does not refuse to serve same-sex 
couples.119 Under this remedy, a baker could declare his moral 
opposition to same-sex unions by placing a sign in the shop window or 
stating his view to customers, while still baking cakes for those 
weddings.120 While the couple would have the cake for their wedding, 
the court would have failed to prevent the emotional injury of feeling 
demeaned. Preventing dignitary, stigmatic injury does not satisfy strict 
scrutiny. 
Because none of the asserted compelling interests meet strict 
scrutiny, the remedy as applied to cakes with expressive speech or 
written speech must be unconstitutional. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
should remand to the state court to allow it to create a remedy that 
does not compel any expression with the intent of a specific message or 
that is likely to be understood by the reasonable observer. This will 
protect the rights of vulnerable minorities desiring access to businesses, 
while also protecting business owners from being forced by the 
government to express a message with which they disagree. 
CONCLUSION 
The disposition suggested above is far from perfect. Rather than 
have a bright-line rule that allows courts, ALJs, and commissions to sift 
speech from discrimination, courts will have to undertake a fact- and 
context-intensive examination into whether conduct satisfies the 
expressive conduct tests laid out in Johnson, Hurley, and FAIR. Ideally, 
 
 117.  See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014)) (holding that stigmatic racial 
injuries do not convey standing); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881—84 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring)(arguing that emotional harm does give standing in Establishment Clause display 
cases). 
 118.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 21, at *56–57. 
 119.  Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd., 370 P.3d 272, 288 (Colo. App. 2014) (“However, 
CADA does not prevent Masterpiece from posting a disclaimer in the store or on the Internet 
indicating that the provision of its services does not constitute an endorsement or approval of 
conduct protected by CADA.”); see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 
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 120.  Masterpiece, 370 P.3d at 288. 
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the courts will then be able to protect the rights of vulnerable 
minorities while not driving business owners from the market for 
following their consciences. A compromise is the only way the court can 
have its cake and eat it too. 
 
